




THE MODUS VIVENDI OF PERSONS WITH  
SCHIZOPHRENIA: VALUECEPTION IMPAIRMENT 
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION
taBle oF CoNteNtS: 1. Introduction; 2. Intersubjective and enactive dimension 
of valueception impairments; 3. The case of Paul Schreber: the modus vivendi 
of persons with schizophrenia and Max Scheler’s phenomenological reduction.
1. Introduction
In recent years, several works have highlighted the relevance of the subjective [Sass & Parnas 2003, Sass 2014] and intercorporeal [Fuchs 
2005; Fuchs & Schlimme 2009] disturbances of the modus vivendi of 
persons with schizophrenia. Earlier, Bin Kimura had already proposed 
to assign a central role to the intersubjective disturbances.1 Underlying 
these attempts there is the need to overcome a purely neurobiological 
perspective and to reach a less partial and reductive understanding of 
the schizophrenic’s modus vivendi. The schizophrenic patient is affected 
in their most profound and non-objectifiable structure: in their being an 
embodied person who feels, expresses themselves, evaluates, prefers, 
loves, hates, positions themselves in the world, and perhaps changes 
when encountering another person. The modus vivendi of persons with 
schizophrenia is a typically human phenomenon and as such has an 
anthropological dimension that has been little investigated so far.
In this perspective, the disturbances of the schizophrenic’s modus 
vivendi do not affect an aseptic subject, but the organ that orientates the 
positioning of the embodied person in the world. German phenomenol-
ogist Max Scheler (1874-1928), referring to Augustine, describes this 
1  Kimura’s analysis of intersubjectivity is based on the Japanese concept of “aida”, 
which means “between” [Kimura 2013].
© 2018 Thaumàzein
10.13136/thau.v6i0 79
the Modus ViVendi oF perSoNS wIth SChIzophreNIa
organ as ordo amoris, i.e. the unique and unmistakable “order” of feel-
ing which structures and directs the intentionality of every individual 
embodied person [Scheler 1973b]. By “order” I do not mean a rule that 
is imposed from above on the emotional sphere by the intellect, but an 
individual and dynamic structure that emerges from feeling through the 
practices of emotional sharing and that reflects the very physiognomy of 
the person [Cusinato 2018b].
The field that extends the analysis of the schizophrenic’s modus 
vivendi to include the core of the person’s structure can be referred 
to as the «psychopathology of the ordo amoris» [Cusinato 2018a]. By 
putting forward a «psychopathology of the ordo amoris», I have tried 
to integrate Sass and Parnas’ [2003] Ipseity-Disturbance Model with a 
phenomenology of the embodied person, so that also the affective, value 
and anthropological dimension of the disturbances of the schizophrenic’s 
modus vivendi can be taken into account [Cusinato 2018a]. Indeed, these 
dimensions have largely remained in the shadows so far.
The research conducted by psychiatrist John Cutting is one of the 
few notable exceptions. In one of his most recent books, A Critique of 
Psychopathology [2011], Cutting aims to overcome a reductive concep-
tion of psychopathology by linking it to the philosophy of the twentieth 
century. Cutting develops a philosophical analysis of psychopathology 
going beyond the standard references to Husserl and Heidegger. Draw-
ing especially on the posthumous writings of the later Scheler, he sheds 
light on some aspects of the schizophrenic’s modus vivendi which oth-
erwise would remain inexplicable. In line with the tradition inaugurated 
by Kurt Schneider’s Die Schichtung des emotionalen Lebens und der 
Aufbau der Depressionszustände [1920], Cutting takes as his reference 
point the value classification offered by Scheler in his Formalismus 
(1913/1916). The numerous studies carried out by Cutting on Scheler 
and psychopathology represent an important contribution to the dia-
logue between psychiatry and philosophy [Cutting 2009; 2016; 2018a; 
2018b].
There are two crucial points in Cutting’s proposal. On the one hand, 
he asserts that an impairment of valueception underlies the schizo-
phrenic’s modus vivendi: «The schizophrenic is […] someone whose 




levels, but whose grasp of spiritual and mental values is intact, if not 
hyperacute» [Cutting 2009, 149]. On the other hand, he identifies an 
analogy between the loss of contact with reality of the schizophrenic’s 
modus vivendi and the bracketing of the vital impulse (Lebensdrang) 
that Scheler places at the basis of phenomenological reduction [Sche-
ler GW IX, 44]. Instead, the modus vivendi of persons with depression 
is made to correspond to the Dionysian reduction, understood as the 
bracketing of the Geist so as to reach a fusion with the vital impulse 
[Cutting 2009, 145; Cutting 2018b].
Here my intention is not to take into consideration Cutting’s position 
as a whole. I do not even wish to dwell on the many aspects of his pro-
posal that I agree with, like his acknowledgment of the central role of the 
Schelerian concept of valueception (Wertnehmung) in psychiatry. Rather, 
I will limit myself to considering what in my opinion are the two some-
what problematic points of Cutting’s proposal: 1) the relationship between 
the impairment of valueception and the perception of certain value class-
es; and 2) the interpretation of Scheler’s phenomenological reduction and 
its comparison with the modus vivendi of persons with schizophrenia.2
2. Intersubjective and enactive dimension of valueception impairments
As we have already seen, Cutting observes that in the schizophrenic’s 
modus vivendi the «grasp of spiritual and mental values is intact, if not 
hyperacute». This statement raises two preliminary fundamental ques-
tions: a) Do «spiritual» and «mental» values coincide or do they belong to 
two different value classes? b) Is what we can observe in the schizophren-
ic’s modus vivendi a simple focus on Geist-related values or is there also 
an ability to understand and interact effectively with these values?
In speaking of spiritual and mental values, Cutting refers explicitly 
to Scheler’s theory of values. In his Formalismus, Scheler distinguishes 
between vital values (vitale Werte), understood as «values of vital feel-
ing» (Werte des vitalen Fühlens) [Scheler GW II, 123], and personal or 
«spiritual» values (geistige Werte). By personal values, Scheler means 
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ethical, aesthetic and cultural values, but not the «mental» values typical 
of positive science [Scheler GW II, 125]. While the class of personal val-
ues establishes the ultimate orientation of phenomenological reduction, 
that of «mental» values underlies scientific reduction (wissenschaftliche 
Reduktion) [Scheler GW X, 461; 482]. The «mental» values concern the 
capacity for abstract reasoning, the kind that allows one e.g. to abstract 
the concept of geometric sphere from a round object [Scheler GW X, 461].
Therefore, for Scheler, personal and mental values are two distinct-
ly different classes of values. So, in the modus vivendi of persons with 
schizophrenia, is there a simple focus on these two classes of values or 
is there also an actual grasping of them?
The focus of the schizophrenic’s modus vivendi on “mental” val-
ues as well as the capacity to really grasp these values is testified to by 
numerous studies that have shown an accentuation of certain intellectu-
al capacities associated with a hyper-reflexive attitude [Pérez-Álvarez 
2008]. It is well known that there are e.g. cases of schizophrenic person-
alities exceptionally gifted in the logical and mathematical fields.
The focus on “personal values” is instead confirmed e.g. by the phe-
nomenon of idionomy. It is widely noted that the schizophrenic person 
tends to remain dissatisfied with commonsensical answers and to ob-
sessively ask questions of a metaphysical or religious nature. However, 
focusing on metaphysical or religious issues does not guarantee, as Cut-
ting claims, an effective grasping of these values. E.g. the fact that the 
schizophrenic person is obsessed with themes that deal with the “sacred” 
does not mean that they are a religious person, a saint or a mystic. If we 
consider e.g. the delusions and hallucinations described by Paul Schre-
ber in Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken [Memoirs of My Nervous 
Illness], it can certainly be concluded that religious and metaphysical 
themes are the center of his interest. However, Schreber brings the whole 
reality back to himself: it is the whole world that “winks” and is traced 
back to his own ego. Scheler, Cutting’s reference, interprets these forms 
of autistic self-focus, which lead to the absolutization of one’s ego, as a 
valueception impairment that compromises the perception of personal 
values. In Scheler’s perspective, Schreber’s religious delusion is there-
fore a valueception impairment concerning personal values.
The above confirms Cutting’s thesis only with respect to mental 
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values, but not to personal ones: it can in fact be observed that the mo-
dus vivendi of persons with schizophrenia is actually focused on per-
sonal values, but this does not guarantee that these values are also really 
grasped, at least not in the sense that they are experienced in the per-
spective of openness to the world (cf. the next paragraph).
On this point, it is interesting to also consider the modus vivendi of 
persons with depression. Several researches show that the characteristic 
traits of melancholia consist in the sense of guilt and the stigmatization 
of one’s emotional anesthesia, as well as in one’s being constantly tor-
mented by ethical questions, by what is false and authentic, right and 
wrong [Stanghellini & Mancini 2017]. The depressive’s modus vivendi, 
therefore, can also involve a focus on ethical values which, as we have 
seen, Scheler places among personal values or Geist-related values. 
Consequently, it is problematic to agree with Cutting’s claim that de-
pressed persons remain confined in their bodily sphere without contact 
with Geist-related values [Cutting 2018b].
These observations suggest that the valueception impairments in 
the modi vivendi of schizophrenia and depression do not concern so 
much the perception of certain value classes, but rather the structure of 
valueception itself. What does Scheler mean by the concept of value-
ception? The compound Wert-nehmung – a neologism that Scheler be-
gan to use in 1913 (it appears several times, for example, in the first edi-
tion of the Sympathiebuch) – was coined on the model of the compound 
Wahr-nehmung, which is usually translated as “perception”. However, 
whereas Wahr-nehmung literally means taking (nehmen) something as 
true (wahr), Wert-nehmung signifies taking or grasping (nehmen) val-
ue (Wert) through feeling ( fühlen). This grasping is not based on rep-
resentation or judgment, but on the image (Bild), and is therefore con-
figured as a primordial perception that precedes and grounds sensible 
perception (Wahrnehmung) [Cusinato 2018a].
According to Scheler, valueception is an original activity that allows 
a living organism to position itself in the environment and a human being 
to position themselves in the world and to practice emotional sharing. In 
this perspective, different forms of valueception impairment correspond 
to the modi vivendi of persons with schizophrenia and depression.
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tify valueception impairments that also concern personal values and 
that lead to absolutizing one’s ego, or to the inability to transcend one’s 
self-referential perspective and to come into contact with another per-
son’s singularity (on this aspect, see the next paragraph).
As regards the depressive’s modus vivendi, it is useful to remember 
that Scheler associates melancholia with the weakening of the pressure 
of the vital impulse (Lebensdrang), a process that Scheler describes 
using the term «insensitivity» (Fühllosigkeit).3 Insensitivity in mel-
ancholia is a particular type of valueception impairment: this form of 
sterilization of valueception drastically reduces the motivations for and 
interest in bodily and emotional interaction with other people and with 
the world. In this case, the valueception impairment compromises the 
motivations of the affective sphere. Insensitivity signalizes a lack of 
motivation and enactive ability. If we can assume that emotions pro-
vide the motivation to perform any movement or action, in the absence 
of emotions, as is the case with insensitivity, paralysis ensues. I have 
already argued that in the depressive’s modus vivendi the valueception 
impairment weakens the enactive capacities of sense making [Cusinato 
2018a]. Moreover, enactivism in psychopathology as well as the rela-
tionship between depression and enactivism are already the focus of 
some recent works [Maiese 2018; Spremberg 2018].
This perspective shift enables us to understand valueception im-
pairments as disturbances related to the very structure of the embodied 
person. Valueception impairments in the modi vivendi of schizophrenia 
and depression signalize that there is a «disorder of the person». I pro-
pose to interpret Scheler’s theory of valueception in the sense of «psy-
chopathology of ordo amoris» [Cusinato 2018a]. The embodied person 
is rooted in the affective sphere and is characterized mainly by being an 
order of feeling. In my opinion, this «order of feeling» should be under-
stood, on the one hand, as an orientation center for emotional sharing 
practices and, on the other, as an enactive center. In the schizophren-
3  «Such “insensitivity” [Fühllosigkeit] is therefore a quite different defect in man to 
lack of co-feeling [Mitgefühl]. It is chiefly found in pathological cases (e.g. in mel-
ancholia), where it arises as a result of the patient’s exclusive preoccupation in his 
own feelings, which altogether prevents him from giving emotional acceptance to the 
experience of other people» [Scheler 2008b, 14, translation modified].
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ic’s modus vivendi, valueception impairments translate into a process of 
disembodiment that undermines the intersubjective dimension, where-
as in the depressive’s modus vivendi of depression they compromise the 
enactive activity [Cusinato 2018a].
3. The case of Paul Schreber: the modus vivendi of persons with schizo-
phrenia and Max Scheler’s phenomenological reduction
Relative to the second point, my arguments turn primarily to the tradi-
tional interpretation of Scheler’s phenomenological reduction, to which 
Cutting also refers, and secondly to the juxtaposition that Cutting pro-
poses between Scheler’s phenomenological reduction and the schizo-
phrenic’s modus vivendi [Cutting 2018a].
Cutting’s proposal is more convincing with respect to Husserl’s 
phenomenological reduction. According to Cutting, the act of ideation 
and intuition of essences (Wesensanschauung) is the key to the phenom-
enological reduction. Scheler, however, confers on this act, conceived 
at first by Husserl, a “moral” meaning and reinterprets it in function 
of an epoché of egocentricity, which is absent in Husserl. As I have 
already shown in several of my previous works, Scheler’s phenomeno-
logical reduction is in some respects “reversed” compared to Husserl’s. 
Indeed, by means of phenomenological reduction, Scheler does not aim 
to bracket the world, but rather the self-referential structure of the sub-
ject that limits our access to the world. The main objective of the phe-
nomenological reduction in Scheler is therefore to increase the openness 
to the world (Weltoffenheit). I have already demonstrated that, contrary 
to what is often supposed, Scheler’s phenomenological reduction does 
not aim to put the whole reality in brackets, but only the reality of the 
structure of the self-referential subject [Cusinato 1998a; 1998b; 1999; 
2012], for only by so doing is it possible to come into living contact with 
the singularity of another person.4 The aim of Scheler’s phenomenologi-
cal reduction is analogous to Jean-Luc Marion’s [1989]: more reduction, 
more givenness, or better, more reduction, more openness to the world 
(Weltoffenheit) [Cusinato 2017a].
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It is evident that, instead, the schizophrenic’s modus vivendi tends to a 
solipsistic closure towards both the world and other persons, as described 
for example by Daniel Paul Schreber in his Memoirs of My Nervous 
Illness. I therefore argue, unlike Cutting, that Scheler’s phenomenological 
reduction and the modus vivendi of persons with schizophrenia move in 
different directions. In Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, Schreber recounts 
the transformations of his own body to better merge with God in a cosmic 
copula. Little by little, his libidinal investment was withdrawn from all 
that lied outside this cosmic copula, so that the «others» were conceived 
as «fleeting-improvised-men», that is, as ghosts. The inability to open up 
to others and to share their experiences clearly emerges here.
Schreber’s modus vivendi closely resembles what Scheler regards as 
an extreme form of «egocentricity» in which everything outside of oneself 
automatically becomes a shadow devoid of its own value.5 The fundamen-
tal difference is that while Scheler considers non-pathological forms of 
egocentricity from an ethical point of view, the modus vivendi experienced 
by Schreber is a form of self-defence without which he probably could 
not survive. Except for this difference, the similarities between Schreber’s 
and Scheler’s descriptions are surprising on this point. In Sympathiebuch 
Scheler notes that in the extreme forms of egocentricity the other is giv-
en only in reference to one’s ego [Cusinato 1998a, 293]. «These others 
certainly exist as souls, but, it is, for all that, a shadowy sort of existence; 
the phrase is significant, for such an existence is in reality and character 
merely relative to his own ego, his own field of values, and his own sup-
posedly absolute notion of reality» [Scheler 2008b, 59]. What is described 
here is a pathological form of egocentricity that Scheler explicitly refers to 
Bleuler’s concept of autism in the dementia precox, i.e. in the schizophre-
nia: «Bleuler’s term “autism” seems the most suitable for the pathological 
symptoms of that type of self-absorption (Selbstversunkenheit) where all 
interest in the environment disappears. He gives an instructive description 
of “autistic” states in his book on Dementia precox» [Scheler 2008b, 58, 
5  «By “egocentricity” I mean the illusion of taking one’s own environment to be the 
world itself, i.e. the seeming givenness of this environment as “the” world. As an 
apprehension of the reality of objects, egocentricity is equivalent to solipsism; with 
regard to volition and practical behaviour, it is egoism; and as an attitude of love it is 
auto-erotism» [Scheler 2008b, 58].
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translation modified]. The others have only a weakened existence, a shad-
owy existence so to speak. They become shadows and ghosts: they are 
reduced to Scheler’s «secondary man» (Nebenmensch) or to Schreber’s 
«fleeting-improvised-men». «In the egocentric and solipsistic attitude, we 
take this secondary man [Nebenmensch], whose existence for us is in fact 
dependent on our own nature and range of interests, as the ultimate and ab-
solute reality of the other» [Scheler 2008b, 59, translation modified]. This 
situation is not determined by logical errors or mistaken reasoning, which 
can therefore be corrected by rational arguments, but by valueception im-
pairments. It concerns a real form of self-deception (Selbsttäuschung) and 
infatuation (Vergaffung) which can distort our relationship with reality.
In normal conditions, this egocentric illusion is contained by cer-
tain feelings, such as the feeling of respect (Ehrfurcht) for life which 
implies the recognition of the value of the other. These feelings do not 
develop through pure mental reflection, but thanks to emotional sharing 
practices that, according to Scheler, are the root of phenomenological 
reduction. As early as 1921, in his essay Vom Wesen der Philosophie, 
Scheler analyzed how the affective structure makes phenomenological 
reduction possible when arguing that the «moral impulse» (moralischer 
Aufschwung) arising from respect for the other is the basis of philoso-
phy [Scheler GW V, 89].
Thanks to the development of feelings such as respect, the other is no 
longer Scheler’s «secondary man» (Nebenmensch) or Schreber’s «fleet-
ing-improvised-man», but becomes a person to whom absolute value must 
be recognized. In this conversion, which coincides with the phenome-
nological reduction, an objectifying conception of the other is overcome 
and it becomes possible to grasp a truth that, translated into the form of 
judgment, would sound more or less like this: «The other, as a human 
being and as a living being, has the same value as you; the other exists in 
a way just as true and authentic as you do; the value of the other is equal 
to your value» [Scheler 2008b, 60, translation modified]. This equality of 
worth once established, the other person also becomes equally real to us, 
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Phenomenological Reduction; Valueception; Schizophrenia; Insensitivity; Enactiv-
ism; Intersubjectivity; Psychopathology of ordo amoris; Max Scheler; Paul Schreber
Abstract
So far, the value dimension underlying affectivity disorders has remained out of fo-
cus in phenomenological psychopathology. As early as at the beginning of the 20th 
century, however, German phenomenologist Max Scheler examined in depth the 
relationship between affectivity and value dimension through the concept of val-
ueception (Wertnehmung). In this sense, a recent noteworthy contribution has been 
provided by John Cutting, who has drawn attention to the importance of Scheler’s 
analyses for psychiatry. In this work I take into consideration only two aspects of 
Cutting’s proposal: 1) the relationship between the impairments of valueception 
and the perception of certain value classes; and 2) the interpretation of Scheler’s 
phenomenological reduction and its juxtaposition with the schizophrenic’s modus 
vivendi. According to Cutting, in the modus vivendi of persons with schizophrenia 
the valueception impairment entails putting vital values in brackets and focusing on 
personal values, with a process that recalls Scheler’s phenomenological reduction. 
Regarding the first aspect, I share Cutting’s starting point, but then shift the focus on 
how important the valueception is for the intersubjective dimension. In particular, I 
maintain that rather than compromising the perception of vital values, valueception 
impairments in the modus vivendi of persons with schizophrenia interfere with the 
intersubjective dimension and are interwoven with a process of disembodiment. My 
thesis is that the modus vivendi of schizophrenia involves a disturbance of the inter-
subjective dimension that arises from the level of valueception and that determines 
the person’s self-referential closure. With regard to the second point, by analyzing 
Scheler’s phenomenological reduction, I sustain that its main objective is to increase 
both the interaction with otherness and the openness to the world (Weltoffenheit). As 
a consequence, the modus vivendi of persons with schizophrenia, in my opinion, is 
not comparable, as Cutting claims, with Scheler’s phenomenological reduction, but 
goes in a different direction.
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